Despite numerous sanctions packages from Ukraine’s Western partners, Russia continues receiving excessive profits from oil sales and importing foreign components for weapons production through third countries. Ukrainian experts analyzed the effectiveness of sanctions over the 1000 days of the full-scale invasion and discussed an action plan to increase economic pressure on the aggressor country. In particular, the Civil Society Council on Sanctions, with the participation of the Trap Aggressor team, prepared a sanctions to-do list with recommendations.

Gaps in sanctions policy in 1000 days of the full-scale war

Russia continues to successfully import components and machines critical for weapons production in violation of sanctions. This significantly strengthens the military-industrial complex (MIC) of the aggressor country, and the production of weapons and ammunition is growing significantly. In 2023, imports of foreign parts reached $27.6 billion. Most of these components enter Russia through third countries: China, the UAE, Turkey, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus.

Similarly, thousands of Western companies still operate in Russia and pay taxes to its budget. This contributes to the the aggressor’s economy and directly sponsors the war against Ukraine.

Another gap in Western sanctions is its policies considering influential Russians: oligarchs, high-ranking officials, and propagandists. These Russians transfer their assets to relatives, colleagues, and other related parties. And sanctions against them are often selective and leave loopholes to circumvent restrictions.

Key priorities in strengthening sanctions policy against Russia

Measures proposed by Ukrainian civil society are aimed at increasing economic pressure, weakening the Russian military-industrial complex, and making it more difficult for Russia to circumvent sanctions. The Civil Society Council on Sanctions and the Trap Aggressor team suggest that partners pay attention to these priorities in improving sanctions policy against Russia:

• expanding coordination and international cooperation. In order for sanctions to work against the enemy, it is necessary to synchronize the sanctions lists of Ukraine’s partner countries, as well as to exchange information and, if necessary, to cooperate to investigate sanctions violations.
• counteracting sanctions circumvention, including the supply of critical components and raw materials through “third” countries.
• focus on sectors critical to Russia’s economy and military capabilities, such as energy, logistics, and defence.
• introduction of standards of responsibility and accountability of businesses for compliance with sanctions.
• improving ways to detect and prevent sanctions violations.
• strengthening the legal and institutional framework, which includes expanding the powers of law enforcement agencies and creating clear procedures for dealing with sanctions violations.
• strategic updates of the sanctions policy, taking new global threats, technologies and changes in the international economy into account.